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Abstract
In The Great Derangement, Amitav Ghosh catalogs contemporary fiction’s failure to
adequately engage with catastrophic climate change. In this thesis, I argue the engagement
problem has a century-old analogue in fiction’s approach to entropy. Entropy was among the
first secular apocalyptic modes in mainstream discourse, and this investigation of authors’
approaches to its portrayal provides a model for understanding fiction’s denial or acceptance of
apocalypse. I first examine William Hope Hodgson’s 1912 novel The Night Land, a far-future
tale set in a post-solar Earth. I contend that Hodgson’s centering of the human experience
prevents him from portraying a true end and instead lends his work anti-apocalyptic energy. This
centering seemingly stems from the nineteenth century episteme, as defined by Foucault, which
privileged taxonomy as the guiding epistemological model. I then contrast The Night Land with
two mid-century stories that more-fully reconcile entropic apocalypse, and which favor a
networked “unit operations” approach as described by the contemporary theorist Ian Bogost.
First, “The Last Question” by Isaac Asimov envisions a cosmic resetting by framing the universe
as protagonist. Second, “Entropy” by Thomas Pynchon looses full-scale entropy on humans both
witting and unwitting, framing human consciousness and ultimately inconsequential.
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1
Introduction – Time Isn’t Holding Up
Zbigniew Lewicki, in his study of apocalyptic fiction and entropy The Bang and the
Whimper, explains that “ . . . the concept of apocalyptic fiction has never been precisely defined.
It is possible that no unequivocal definition can ever be formulated” (xiii). Perhaps that is true in
the sense that the twentieth century saw a splintering of apocalypse as an idea, and thus divergent
narratives can claim the title of apocalyptic fiction. In recent cultural memory, apocalyptic
concern has been passed around from clergy and theologians to physicists, astronomers, cult
leaders, political protesters, social critics, and climate scientists. With these many claims to
apocalypse, what should apocalyptic fiction even look like?
In my investigation of several signposts of twentieth century apocalyptic fiction, I
attempt to give a shape and definition to an entropic apocalyptic fiction. Entropic apocalyptic
fiction is a mode of the narrative made possible via the understanding of entropy and universal
heat death, principles from physics which eventually imprinted on the cultural imagination. In
science, an understanding of entropy cropped up in the 1870s. Its portrayal in literature began
tentatively, just past the turn of the twentieth century, but strengthened mid-century as
information networks and computational complexity began to redefine scientific thought.
Entropic fiction was perhaps the first secular, scientifically-grounded apocalyptic mode in
mainstream literature, though its portrayal proved a challenge in ways we see anew as fiction
now grapples with the reality of climate catastrophe.
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In Apocalyptic Transformation, Elizabeth K. Rosen suggests two broad categories of
apocalyptic fiction. She shows a split between apocalyptic modes which suppose a “New
Jerusalem” (1) — such as in works of Alan Moore, Terry Gilliam, and the Wachowskis—and
those that do not. In diverse ways, the creators of New Jerusalem fictions all offer possibility an
End that leads to a transformed—though not always improved — world. She also, though,
chronicles Kurt Vonnegut’s apocalyptic works, namely Cat’s Cradle and Galapagos, which
show other ways to view apocalyptic destiny. In Galapagos, mankind’s isolated survivors of
plague evolve over one million years into a non-human species. Rosen wonders if “it is the
irrevocable end of humankind, or is it, in fact, a New Jerusalem” (61). Cat’s Cradle, meanwhile,
is unambiguous. The novel’s Ice-9 fueled apocalypse shows only “destruction . . . [making] no
suggestion that there is a new or better world to be inherited afterward” (47). Vonnegut’s
concern is not entropy, but his result resembles an entropic end in its finality. This second style
of apocalypse, that of a total End unconcerned with humanity’s grand narrative, was born of the
late-nineteenth century’s scientific discoveries. No matter how rational this style of apocalypse
may be, it has proven difficult to reconcile in fiction.
Via three significant works concerning entropy, I will look directly at entropic
apocalyptic fiction and explore why and how an entropic end is rejected or accepted in such
works. In studying this topic, I will explain the entropic mode in general and also incongruities
therein by exploring dominant paradigms of popular scientific thought. First, I will detail
William Hope Hodgson’s semi-obscure, far-future epic The Night Land. This 1912 novel is an
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admirable and baffling early attempt to reconcile emerging evidence of entropic inevitability
with heroic, proto-sci-fi storytelling. Though Hodgson ultimately cannot accept true entropy into
his storytelling vision, his failure to do so is telling of how such themes simply could not fit into
broader turn-of-the-century consciousness, even for the scientifically inclined. Scientific
understanding, Hodgson ultimately shows us, does not always move in a single direction and
does not easily supersede the inertia of cultural thought and mores—a point made all too clear by
twenty-first century cultures sprinting toward self-made environmental destruction.
Amitav Ghosh, in his 2016 study on mainstream fiction’s failures to reconcile climate
catastrophe, The Great Derangement, argues that an “inertia of habitual motion,” prevents our
acceptance of new truths, however urgent they may be (54). He claims this inertia is rooted at the
individual level, as personal experience is the baseline for human understanding. Perhaps this is
why Frank Kermode, in The Sense of an Ending, describes secular apocalyptic storytelling as a
metaphorical mode for the psyche’s negotiation of personal end. Ghosh fixates on literary
fiction’s move toward slice-of-life pieces that prioritize “style and ‘observation,’ whether it be of
everyday details, traits of character, or nuances of emotion” (27). This “realist” style leaves little
room for portraying grand, dramatic events and catastrophes. Like Ghosh, Kermode considers
fiction’s move away from epic narrative to small-scale “realist” storytelling, and believes the
move altered the relationship between apocalyptic thought and popular storytelling.
And where Kermode considers apocalyptic storytelling in the twentieth century a
metaphor for personal death (and vice versa), Lois Parkinson Zamora even considers some
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apocalypse a metaphor for apocalypse, as she feels apocalypse cannot be untethered from its
longer cultural tradition. In Writing the Apocalypse, she addresses Thomas Pynchon, whose
“Entropy” will comprise the third section of this discussion. Zamora says Pynchon “reacts
against” the “conventional sense and structure of the apocalypse” by “substituting the metaphor
of entropy for the apocalypse” (120). Zamora, like Kermode, believes magical realism the only
vessel of traditional apocalypse in serious twentieth century fiction. Unlike Kermode, though,
Zamora suggests a story of entropy—and, we would then have to assume, exterminating
apocalypses—cannot be apocalypse at all, because there is not renewal waiting on the other side.
Depending on definition, apocalypse can be a metaphor for apocalypse.
The apocalyptic impulse, Kermode says, made a transition via the novel’s sophistication,
realm of epic, mythic storytelling (again, barring magical realism) toward a personal, inwardlooking fictive consciousness. Personal death and apocalyptic end became symbols for one
another as the scope of consideration in popular storytelling narrowed. “[The] type figures [of
apocalypse] were modified,” he says, “made to refer not to a common End but to personal death
or to crisis.” Similarly, “literary fictions changed in the same way—perpetually recurring crises
of the person, and the death of that person, took over from myths which purport to relate one’s
experience to the grand beginnings and ends” (35). In a more secular, scientific world, he says,
the mysteries shifted from a divine realm to a personal one. Apocalyptic energies transferred to
personal experience and dread. In Kermode’s estimation, by the twentieth century literary fiction
was expanding the realm of inner life to a point where personal experience took over for
universal myths. This progressive narrowing of scope, as the intensely-personal became
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metaphor for broader populations or existence itself, is not well equipped for depicting grandscale apocalypses, even if scientifically verified and inevitable. At the very moment that
secularism narrowed the scope of such investigations, science revealed grand-scale apocalyptic
forces which seem almost divine in scope. How can such tension be resolved?
Some entropic fiction of the mid-twentieth century found ways of dramatizing entropy. I
will argue that Hodgson represents the cusp in two paradigms of thought, defined by Michel
Foucault as Classical and Modern epistemes (The Order of Things 328-330). Hodgson lived
outside an episteme that could allow him to incorporate pure entropic principles into his grand
vision, as non-existence was beyond the boundary of the era’s thought. Select later authors,
living in an era more comfortable with networked-thinking (rather than the taxonomic thinking
prominent, Foucault Says, in nineteenth-century style though) would not have the same difficulty
as Hodgson in de-centering the human experience and portraying full entropy. Said difficulty in
dramatizing full entropy into his novel will be contrasted with two stories from the Cold War era
that manage to do so. These stories show that the collective imagination can shift in order to
reconcile ideas that appear initially irreconcilable. This shift takes more than just time, though—
it takes a change in how we think about the systems of nature. And, importantly, we must
understand that this shift is not part of a linear movement in social thought. As Amitav Ghosh
claims, we are collectively again in a position like Hodgson, struggling to reconcile what is
scientifically assured.
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To chart the fiction of entropic acceptance, I will first detail Isaac Asimov’s 1956 story
“The Last Question,” a cyclical science fiction narrative that imagines the final showdown—and
compromise—between universal entropy and technological progress, trillions of years in the
future. I will then look at Thomas Pynchon’s 1960 story “Entropy,” which portrays the mundane
events leading up to an unceremonious, universal entropic halting on a nondescript February
morning. These works, from the same era as one another though belonging to slightly different
literary schools, dramatize the entropic apocalypse with divergent styles but a similar
consciousness. While Pynchon was working in the burgeoning postmodern idiom, Asimov was
writing for pulpy science fiction quarterlies. And where Pynchon’s story mostly relies on
realism to create a sense of dread, Asimov’s writing quickly leaves the recognizable behind in
favor of space-age speculation. Both works, though, are essential portraits of how fiction can
accept and dramatize a secular, scientific apocalypse. Hodgson accepts that the sun will someday
expire, but cannot portray a world devoid of some abstract life energy and human spirit, even
after the world has “ended.” Pynchon and Asimov, meanwhile, model an entropic acceptance
made possible by leaning in to a scientific view that gives the human experience no primacy.
Both authors￼’ entropic ends are made possible through an emerging, network-focused
cognitive paradigm, which has been defined by theorist Ian Bogost as “unit operations” (3).
In pursuing this argument, I first analyze what themes should define apocalyptic fiction.
Eschatology has traditionally been tied to grand showdowns of good and evil, heavenly and
earthly forces, and sin against virtue. Martin Meisel, in 2016’s Chaos Imagined, tracks how
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anxiety about “chaotic” energies, such as war, the carnivalesque, complexity, and social
turbulence, have been tied to ideas of Armageddon throughout history. Frank Kermode describes
apocalypse as “an ordered series of events which ends, not in a great New Year, but in a final
Sabbath” (5), but maintains that “there are two orders of time,” being the earthly, which stops,
and the “eternal” duration, that which supersedes man’s understanding. Those three examples
show different strands of thought toward the apocalypse: apocalypse as a divine showdown to
extoll God, apocalypse as a general breakdown in the order of man’s institutions, and apocalypse
as man’s ending within the context of larger eternal cosmic order. They are all, though, based on
dichotomies, without which such models cannot find meaning.
In the most basic sense, these dichotomies are the basis of Foucault’s “discursive
formations.” Foucault argues that a sense of “object” emerged post-Enlightenment that is defined
by discursive categorization. He famously focuses on the nineteenth century phenomena
psychopathological segregation of “the madman” in asylums and the creation of new conceptual
objects (i.e. the conglomeration of symptoms into new conditions) (40). For our purposes, a
simpler example may be more economical. Think of a dichotomous key. One of the most
straightforward tools in natural sciences, a dichotomous key presents series of either-or questions
that, when answered, will eventually lead to identification of some plant or animal. For Foucault,
a guiding dichotomy was that of sane and insane, a hallmark of post-Enlightenment thinking and
categorization. Whether the scope is bark or un-barked, sane or insane, good or evil—
dichotomous discursive formations were and are central components of modern thought.
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During that same era, ownership of apocalypse as an idea has shifted (though maybe not
wholly changed hands). Beginning in mid-nineteenth century Europe (Meisel 384), notions of
Entropy and the heat death of the universe found their way into popular discourse. By the early
twentieth century, apocalypse transitioned from a purely sacred concern to a secular one. As
such, the notion of what counts as apocalyptic in literature and art became (and remains) up for
debate, and scholarly definitions of “apocalyptic” were open to exploration.
Entropy was not the only scientific notion spawning new mass anxieties. Darwinism and
geologic deep time emerged as new intellectual realities as the nineteenth century drew to a
close, conflicting with extant creation and destruction myths. Thanks to industrialization, newlyformalized public daily time conflicted with what was historically a personal or municipal
measurement. At the turn of the century, paradigms of time, history, and the fate of the universe
were all pulled in new directions. Each presented not only uncertainty or change, but a
dichotomous conflict between an old truth and a new truth. The scope and limits of universal
history were realistically in flux in a new way. “Three versions of nightmare fraught with
entropic chaos,” Martin Meisel says, “troubled the spirit of the declining nineteenth and dawning
twentieth centuries: ecological, cosmological, and anthropological (413). The universe could
now be seen as just a large machine that would run out of steam. Hodgson would attempt to deal
with this issue, but could not separate the universe from the broader human spirit and will to
carry on. Later, by not framing the universe in terms of hierarchies or human interest, Asimov
and Pynchon would show a framework for writing about apocalypse.
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Some people can perhaps accept entropy and deep time as trivialities, as they do not seem
to directly affect daily life. Others, such as the authors explored in this investigation, fixate on
these notions, trying to reconcile them with the human experience. Perhaps because the new
scientific propositions emerging with the twentieth century were so mind-bending, many of the
artists seriously considering these themes produced the kind of speculative work often looked
over by their contemporary critics. Kermode’s The Sense of An Ending (1966) is perhaps the
authoritative piece of mid-century apocalyptic criticism, and it is unconcerned with the
speculative genres which were most willingly engaging with entropic apocalyptic themes most
directly. Kermode grounds his discussion in Judeo-Christian traditions (5,8, 9,13, etc.) and
canonical literary tradition, such as Homer (5), Shakespeare (18), Dostoyevsky (22), and so on,
and only engages with acceptably literary fictions. I suggest this is emblematic of a kind of
cultural “lag” when approaching apocalyptic fictions of the twentieth century. Regarding an
entropic end for the universe, scientific thought outpaced mainstream thought, speculative fiction
outpaced mainstream fiction, and literary criticism engaged first with the literature less explicitly
fixated on the concerns in question. To clarify by oversimplifying: critical investigation fell
behind cultural production and did not engage with the most relevant fictions, thus allowing
definiteness to seem confused and blurred.
I suggest a simple definition: apocalyptic fiction is that which dramatizes the absolute
end of humanity and/or engages the unstoppable death of the universe. I will argue that
“workaround” fictions, of which The Night Land is actually a strong early example, are
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apocalypse denial fictions. This includes works that fall in the post-apocalyptic genre(s), which
show how life goes on after the end. By their very nature, life-after-apocalypse narratives suggest
an un-absoluteness to apocalypse, tacitly (or overtly) arguing that the human spirit can overcome
any obstacle. The lesson of entropy is that an absolute end is insurmountable, human spirit be
damned. Asimov, as we will see, engages elegantly with this tension. Hodgson and Pynchon live
at the poles.
For succinctness, I propose two terms to describe the apocalyptic impulses.
“Culmination” is the absolute end of humanity. “Cessation” is the unstoppable death of the
universe. Truly entropic apocalyptic fiction engages both impulses, though a work like Kurt
Vonnegut’s Cat’s Cradle can dramatize culmination to an absolute degree such that cessation
will never engage mankind, and thus is irrelevant. It is the absoluteness of these two modes that
separates scientific apocalypse, as crystalized by the entropic concept, from Judeo-Christian
eschatology. In a story like the great flood, we see humanity re-built. In Revelation, apocalypse
leads to the New Jerusalem. In thermodynamics, meanwhile, there is no way to “unring the bell.”
That idea, of a finality that encompasses all and is not just a step in some more profound process,
is the basis of purely apocalyptic literature on display by the time of Pynchon and Asimov.
Why such absolutism? The turn of the century saw growing acceptance of the second law
of thermodynamics and its wide-ranging implications. Put simply, the second law recognizes that
no transfer of energy is wholly efficient. In any transfer of energy, some energy is wasted and
cannot be recovered, and the process “can be neither stopped nor reversed—and there will be no
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regeneration” (Lewicki xv). In one sense, this energy loss is a simple matter, one which the
scientist Oliver J. Lodge in 1894 called “nothing more than enlightened common sense” (cited
by R.H.T. 24). When examined on a universal scale, however, the implication is clear—at some
point, the universe will expend all of its energy. In the same era, “[the] geologist’s discovery of
‘deep time’ extended the life of the universe from thousands past millions into billions of years,”
(Morse 40). In the span of a few decades, scientific thought revealed the earth (and thus the
universe) to be unimaginably old, but also destined to eventually expand all of its energy and
reach a point of stasis. Thus, truly apocalyptic thought should acknowledge a total end (though
Asimov still finds a clever way to skirt this, to an extent).
While that absolutism is easy enough to propose in the twenty-first century, it is more
difficult to accept and dramatize—especially if coming from an earlier worldview that predated
network consciousness (the eventual product, I will argue, of the modern thought paradigm
detailed by Foucault) and events like world war, cold war, information technologies, and
ecological criticism. To more fully understand the early implications and difficulties of
incorporating entropy into fiction, The Night Land is an excellent starting point. It is extremely
early entropic fiction and actively pursues tension between humanity’s past and future. It is also
enthrallingly odd by the standards of any era. The Night Land ultimately is too skeptical (or
optimistic) to accept entropy as a fully apocalyptic force, but its inability to do so will aid us in
appreciating the forces at work in Pynchon and Asimov’s attempts a half-century later.
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Chapter 1— The Night Land: We All Shine On
Alan Gregory, in 2015’s Science Fiction Theology, notes a pertinent demarcation in the
history of apocalyptic speculation. He posits that the early nineteenth century was a significant
turning point toward a secular apocalyptic experience. The era saw the popularization of the “last
man” theme via several significant works. As the name suggests, these works fantasize about a
sole survivor at humanity’s end surveying what’s left and experiencing what Gregory calls an
“apocalyptic sublime” (153). Gregory highlights Thomas Campbell’s 1823 poem “The Last
Man” and John Martin’s 1833 painting of the same name, which was probably inspired by
Campbell. These works both focus on a single, sole-survivor figure surveying the collapsed
remnants of civilization before a fading sun. This apocalyptic image is significant because it
“recasts apocalyptic expectation into the temporality of transience and decline” (157). This new
apocalypse could only exist due to growing secularization. “Whereas in classical apocalyptic
literature, history concludes in the action of God,” Gregory says, “here . . . [h]umanity dies by
length of time” (157).
Catherine Redford explains that the trope became a bit of a Romantic fad, highlighted
especially by Campbell’s poem and Mary Shelley’s 1818 The Last Man. She tracks the theme as
running from 1806 to the mid 1830s, singling out 1826 as a year that “saw a flood of Last Man
texts hit the market as the theme reached its peak in popularity.” She says it receded quickly,
however, as “the genre became increasingly farcical, and the Last Man texts which followed over
the next few years tended to be either mocking in tone or wearily derivative” (Redford).
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Fad or no, this the vision of apocalypse presented in last man works shows a fracturing of
apocalypse that would never be undone. A version of apocalypse based on temporality and the
forces of nature had been established, and would return to prominence in the twentieth century as
temporality and conceptions of the changed in uncanny ways. Campbell’s poem is one in which
“the world [as] God’s creation is seemingly forgotten” and “the logic of continuity and
discontinuity, creation and resurrection, essential to a Christian eschatology” is cast off (Gregory
157). The powerful last man image, when it appeared, was both frightening and evocative. These
works seemed to show the spirit of man holding through to the last. The works, according to
Gregory, found a way to evoke the sublime of biblical revelation but eschew biblical narrative,
transposing the theme to a secular consciousness. In essence, the last man fad set the stage for
the kind of secular apocalypse that would be dreamed up in the twentieth century, when
scientific advancements revealed natural mechanisms which could, indeed, bring about an
absolute end over time.
But what is that apocalyptic length of time? Frank Kermode speaks of an uncertain “ticktock interval” as essential to the modern apocalyptic (55). He draws on the tension of measured
time, saying people live in a present between the tick and the tock, or the beginning and end (of
the world and of our own lives), with an awareness of each but an indeterminate space between
them and ourselves. “Our ways of filling in the interval between the tick and the tock,” he says,
“must grow more difficult and more self-critical, as well as more various” in the modern age
(63). The tock is out there, but we cannot be sure when it will arrive.
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Stephen Kern, in The Culture of Time and Space, uses the telephone in a similar regard.
He explains the tension between caller and (potential) recipient. “The active mode [of
communication],” he explains, “is heightened for the caller who can make things happen
immediately . . . while the intrusive effect of ringing augments the expectant mode for the person
called” (91). Further, “the recipient of the call [is] first suspended in waiting,” which became a
new “symbol for loneliness” in the era (91). One can imagine the telegraph office playing the
same role in the decades leading up to the telephone. The possibility of immediacy did not
eradicate the uncertainty of waiting, it but infused into waiting a new tension. Everything in a life
could now change in an instant, and until then one could wait, lonely and impatient, on the phone
to ring and do just that.
In essence, time itself transitioned from an intuitive or personal force to an uncanny
force. Amitav Ghosh defines the uncanny feeling as “the presence and proximity of nonhuman
interlocutors…[having] the ability to intervene directly in human thought” and actions (30). At
the turn of the twentieth century, time transitioned into one such uncanny force. Stephen Kern
makes much of “the introduction of standard time at the end of the nineteenth century” exploring
the demise of “[the] heterogeneity private time and its conflict with public time” (11-13). Prior to
the standardizing of time—a move to ease logistical issues in commerce and rail travel—time
had largely existed in the individual consciousness rather than the public sphere. Municipal time
existed, but was subject to the whims of localities and largely non-binding. Now, with geologists
redefining time in the macro and governments and companies redefining time in the micro, a
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new message merged: time exists without, not within, you. This message ran counter to what
people had experienced for thousands of years, and it upended both biblical and personal truths.
Time, previously a divine or a personal matter, was becoming a regulated outside force.
Ghosh, when defining the uncanny, is speaking of the human relationship with climate
change. The role of climate in our lives has changed radically because of direct human actions.
With global warming, humans created a Frankensteinian new force—something we crated but
which now affects us in ways beyond our direct control. Time also operates on this level. Once
standardized, accepted, and integrated into daily life worldwide, public time became a force
which could dictate actions, shape lives for the worse, and thwart human self-determination,
despite the human role in its creation. Institutions were built on it, work lives determined by it,
and people were disciplined for failing to adhere to it1. All the while, physicists had now
determined that deep time would necessarily end the universe, no matter how much people
resisted it, no many how many advancements in society were made, and no matter how much
technology continued to advance.
It is not for nothing that The Night Land was published in 1912. Kern singles the year
out. Not only was 1912 the year of the International Conference on Time, but he singles out
perhaps the first two significant paintings to portray clocks—The Watch by Juan Gris and The

1

Or, in the words of Frank Zappa, people “WORSHIPPED IT as a WAY OF LIFE, and took their little pills by it,
and went back 'n forth from work by it, and paid their rent by it, and before long they were even having BIRTHDAY
PARTIES IN THE OFFICE by it, because NOW, AT LAST, GREGGERY PECCARY's exciting new invention had
made it possible for everyone to find out HOW OLD THEY WERE!” (Zappa)
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Enigma of the Hour by Giorgio de Chirico (12, 22-23). It may sound odd, but Kern simply
“[had] not been able to find clocks” in art until 1912 (22). One can assume that William Hope
Hodgson, a resident of continental Europe during the push for public time, was aware of the
movement. We can also assume that, having been born in 1877, Hodgson must have read some
last man fictions, as he demonstrates an enthusiasm for speculative and romantic work in his own
fiction. And one can solidify these assumptions by looking at his deeply weird, space-time
obsessed, horror-romance novel The Night Land.
Published about a century after the last man fad and in the heart of the public-time
debate, the novel married themes of last survivors and an entropic earth defined by the passage
of time. The introduction of entropy is a significant twist on last man storytelling. In Campbell’s
last man poem, the causes of man’s end were war, plague and famine (Campbell 15-18). In
Shelley’s novel, too, war and plague hasten humanity’s fall (Redford). These themes, of course,
recall the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse, catalysts of change “wherein the familiar
world . . . is turned or returned to chaos” (Meisel 273). These are events of great scale— a scale
that would require a cataclysm even beyond the great disasters history had already eclipsed, such
as grad wars and the black plague. That is, the war, famine, or plague that could wipe out
humanity were necessarily on a fantastical scale that had no real-world grounding. When it was
Hodgson’s turn to tackle the last man themes, he grounded his tale in time, not calamity. He was
transposing new concerns of his day: an obsession with time and its scientifically-ensured
exhaustion—even if he ultimately rejected entropy’s fullest implications.

17
The Night Land — The Unnamable Artifact
The Night Land, perhaps owing to its bizarre prose style, dubious length, and spotty
publication history, is not often discussed by mainstream critics. China Miéville, a contemporary
weird fiction author, is one critic who has given the novel a detailed analysis. He classified The
Night Land as “abcanny,” generally meaning “non-normal,” focusing on its monsters as
“teratological expressions of that unrepresentable and unknowable, the evasiveness of meaning”
(381). He makes no attempts, though, to codify the “abcanny” into a genre, and only tangentially
mentions one other author (Lovecraft) as employing “abcanny” elements. In 1985, Brian
Stableford grouped Hodgson in with about a dozen pre-war British science fiction authors, who
he said wrote in a “Scientific Romance” genre (Hughes 78), essentially meaning works with a
science fiction impulse, but before the widespread influence of American science fiction authors.
George P. Landlow, in 1979, simply called the novel a “darker” fantasy (37), without a more
concrete genre tag. Other critical definitions are difficult to find, if they are out there at all.
Without a critical consensus on the novel’s classification, readers provide a definition. A cursory
roundup of reader descriptions shows the novel tagged as horror (goodreads.com), apocalyptic
horror (desustorage.org), post-apocalyptic (librarything.com), science fiction horror
(alt.books.ghost-fiction), creature horror (besthorrornovels.com), fantasy (goodreads.com),
dying earth fantasy (wikipedia.org), dystopian science fiction (goodreads.com), weird fiction
(besthorrornovels.com), and “more Lovecraft than Lovecraft” (reddit.com/printSF). Owing to the
novel’s telepathy, monsters, and far-future landscape, these descriptions all at least land in the
neighborhood(s) of speculative fiction, as some mix of horror-science fiction-fantasy-adventure
with seemingly apocalyptic currents. The novel avoids straightforward classification wherever it
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can, and it ultimately operates as a philosophical meditation on skepticism of definite societal
constructions.
The question of genre is important to understand the novel’s significance in the lineage of
entropic fiction. In 2015, Dover reissued the novel as part of its “Doomsday Classics” line.
Other novels in that line are classically “postapocalyptic.” Richard Jeffrie’s 1885 After London
explores England in the wake of cataclysm, when “towns have collapsed and given way to
forests, and the few scattered survivors have descended into barbarism.” Jack London’s 1912
The Scarlet Plague is a piece of contagion horror, in which a toxic disease kills millions and
“[art], science, and learning die with them while the few survivors degenerate into feral clans.”
In George Allen England’s 1914 Darkness and Dawn, “[Manhattan’s]architecture isn't all that's
crumbled—humanity has degenerated,” fifteen hundred years in the future, “into roving tribes of
murderous, misshapen creatures” (amazon.com). Each of these novels follows a similar formula:
Disaster strikes, population drops, society revert to barbarism, and a lone survivor or two band
together to rebuild humanity. These novels are typically cataclysmic, dystopian, and follow the
eschatological “rebirth” model of apocalypticism. Superficially, The Night Land may belong
with this group of novels, but it is actually an outlier; the cataclysm of The Night Land isn‘t
disaster or disease, but the deep-time dilemma of entropy. If there ever were major disasters that
ravaged the population (which is suggested by legend but unverifiable), it occurred millions of
years prior. Hodgson’s world is orderly rather than chaotic, and while there is a “lone hero,” his
quest is personal rather than for broader human salvation. Even within the specific sub-genre of
apocalyptic horror novels clustered around the turn of the twentieth century, The Night Land is a
contrary, singular work that squirms its way out of easy categorization. It denies the apocalyptic
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impulses of its “companion” novels, instead presenting an ambivalent, skeptical worldview that
doubts the possibility of annihilation, rebirth, or progress.
Published in 1912, the novel does not have many immediate stylistic peers, and even
Hodgson’s other fiction never quite entered into the same territory. Much of Hodgson’s work is
more straightforward: the adventure stories of “Captain Gault” and “Captain Jat,” the nautical
tales of the “Sargasso Sea” stories, and the supernaturally-tinged “Carnacki the Ghost Hunter”
series, which skews more toward detective fiction than horror or sci-fi (as in the case of “The
Thing Invisible,” in which the presumed specter haunting a chapel is revealed to merely be a
hidden spring that propels knives through the air.) Hodgson’s novels are weirder. The Boats of
the “Glen Carrig” (1907) and The Ghost Pirates (1909) blend nautical adventure with
supernatural creatures. 1908’s The House on the Borderland7 is The Night Land’s closest
relative—a frame narrative fixated on grotesque monsters and a pervasive atmosphere of the
uncanny, and its narrator describes an interdimensional travel to a world of monsters. Hodgson,
like any author, definitely has identifiable go-to devices that show up in multiple works. The
Night Land is unique, though, in two important ways.
First, its pseudo-archaic prose style is largely without precedent (or, really, successor),
though we could perhaps call it “futuristically-biblical.” The novel, around two-hundred
thousand words long, contains no dialogue. Nearly every paragraph begins with a conjunction
(usually “And”), the language is full of odd capitalization and terminology, and syntax is often
inverted. Reading the text is an almost Borgesian experience, like having found an unmarked,
ancient tome in the basement of a long-shuttered library. The novel does not just describe a
mutated world, but also tries to give the reader an unsettling artifact of that world by introducing
a prose style wholly contained to the telling of this single novel. Combined with the utterly
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strange subject matter, the novel provides an otherworldly reading experience. From the second
chapter:
And, presently, alone in all the miles of that night-grey road, I saw
one in the field of my glass—a quiet, cloaked figure, moving
along, shrouded, and looking neither to right nor left. And thus was
it with these beings ever. It was told about in the Redoubt that they
would harm no human, if but the human did keep a fair distance
from them; but that it were wise never to come close upon one.
And this I can well believe.
And so, searching the road with my gaze, I passed beyond this
Silent One, and past the place where the road, sweeping vastly to
the South-East, was lit a space, strangely, by the light from the
Silver-fire Holes. And thus at last to where it swayed to the South
of the Dark Palace, and thence Southward still, until it passed
round to the Westward, beyond the mountain bulk of the Watching
Thing in the South—the hugest monster in all the visible Night
Lands. My spy-glass showed it to me with clearness—a living hill
of watchfulness, known to us as The Watcher Of The South. It
brooded there, squat and tremendous, hunched over the pale
radiance of the Glowing Dome. (24)
This style continues, without variation, for more than five-hundred pages. It is as hypnotic as it is
perplexing, and disrupts attempts to place the work neatly within the confines of any single genre
or literary context. Its closest equivalent in Hodgson’s canon is The Boats of the “Glen Carrig,”
but even that densely-styled novel contains dialog and a more modern syntax. With The Night
Land, Hodgson uses a unique textual style to defy any sense of being anchored to an extant
literary era or genre. Dealing with unimaginable subject matter (i.e. a post-Sun world), Hodgson
constructs an alien storytelling style to match the subject’s weirdness and irreconcilability.
Secondly, the novel creates an unrecognizable second world (somewhat like
Borderland’s monster realm), but claims the landscape is in fact our same Earth, millions of
years hence. There is no sun, there are unmoving monsters the size of mountains, and glowing
mists drift through the land—but this is our world. Legend holds that the Great Redoubt is
situated in a deep seismic canyon created millions of years after our time, but millions of years
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before The Night Land. The narrator recounts that an “earthquake did burst the world up, along a
certain great curve where it had weakness; and there fell into the yawning furnace of the world,
one of the great oceans; and immediately made of itself steam, and so brake upwards again, and
tore the earth mightily in its swift uprising” (87). Hodgson claims this unrecognizable landscape
is the result of natural processes—that our own world may one day resemble the world of The
Night Land. While his other works suggested mysterious supernatural forces at work in our
world, The Night Land emphasizes the radical malleability of mankind and our planet, by
stripping away almost all recognizable characteristics of contemporary culture and habitat. In
this novel, Hodgson suggest that all elements of historical western life are not just arbitrary, but
ultimately insignificant, and that the true scope of humanity is nearly incomprehensible.
These two factors create, to borrow a term from the novel, a “monstrous futureness” for
the reader (21). Both the unusual prose and the radically transformed Earth it describes leave the
work a step removed from recognizable time and space, and incongruous with most genre tags.
The science fiction scholar Chris Morgan calls this mode of literature “predictive fiction.” His
survey covers works from 1800 to 1945, grouping together works from various genres and styles
that take advantage of the “wide open spaces of the dynamic future” that captivated the public
imagination in the eras of exploration and colonialism (6, 15-16). The Night Land, with its farfuture setting and mutated vision of geography and humanity, fits comfortably within the style
Morgan describes. However, Hodgson’s novel complicates the discussion once we try to pin
down its intent or general worldview. Morgan catalogs roughly six aims of predictive fiction:
dire warnings, satire, escapism, wish fulfillment, serious prediction, and philosophical
discussion. In my estimation, these six aims fall into two camps: didactic futurism and broad
futurism. Dire warning, wish fulfillment, and serious prediction are didactic, in that they offer
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firm acceptance or rejection of a future seen as consequential to present human actions. Satire,
escapism, and philosophical discussion are the broad aims: they draw contrast to the present via
actions set in the future, but do not guarantee a value judgement about the present or the future.
Hodgson resists using his predictive story to make direct, good-or-bad value judgments, leaning
instead toward far-reaching skepticism and ambivalence.
According to Morgan, most predictive fiction fits into the “dire warning” category,
whether “the warning is explicit and unmistakable,” or “[offering] implicit cautions” (17).
Frequently, he says, the warnings “are those of political dystopias” and “the misuse of science”
(18). The society of the Redoubt is oddly apolitical. While life is rigidly ordered—people spend
their whole lives in one profession, whether farmer or scholar or teacher, and live within one city
(i.e. one story) the entire time—there is no mention of a governing body. The narrator describes
“Law” and “Lesser Law,” enforced by a Master Watchman and his subordinates, but, as with the
scholars or farmers, they seem to perform this task simply because it is their job (66, 69). The
law can be harsh. For instance, any who leave the pyramid without permission and survive the
adventure are publicly flogged upon their return, so as to “[make] human signposts of pain for
the benefit of others,” even if there is a noble reason for venturing out (55). There is even a
flayed skin posted near the outer gate, in view of the entire pyramid, as warning against violating
the Law. However, there is no sign of any urge for rebellion within the Redoubt. The populace
seems fully content with the Watchmen and the Law. The society is portrayed as simultaneously
draconian and content. Hodgson’s world is brutal but ordered. There seems no impetus to call
The Night Land’s world either utopian or dystopian. It simply exists as it is—neither dire
warning nor wish fulfillment.
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Commentary on science, wither via its misuse or perfection, is also missing. In fact, the
word only appears in the text once. The narrator, speculating about the origin of monsters, says
“The evil must surely have begun in the Days of the
Darkening (which I might liken to a story which was believed
doubtfully, much as we of this day believe the story of the
Creation). A dim record there was of olden sciences (that are yet
far off in our future) which, disturbing the unmeasurable Outward
Powers, had allowed to pass the Barrier of Life some of those
Monsters and Ab-human creatures, which are so wondrously
cushioned from us at this normal present. And thus there had
materialized, and in other cases developed, grotesque and horrible
Creatures, which now beset the humans of this world” (25).
The statement is vague and brief. It does imply that the night land’s horrors were unleashed in
part because of a misuse of science, though the narrator implies also that the story may be
apocryphal. The Redoubt—a miles-high pyramid providing shelter and sustenance to millions of
people for millions of years— is itself a massive feat of scientific wisdom. The narrator presents
simultaneous examples of how scientific learning may destroy or save us, with no definitive
commitment to either view. Once again, Hodgson’s novel evades taking a stand on a central
issue in predictive fiction.
The Night Land certainly is not wish fulfillment, beyond the default assumption that
“most of mankind has an insatiable desire to know what will happen tomorrow, next month,
next year, next century” (Morgan 111). But most wish fulfillment fiction, according to Morgan,
is based on some longed-for positive outcome for humanity (or one segment thereof). Hodgson
indulges in our desire to see the future, and taps into morbid fascination about how life on Earth
may go wrong, but his world is not one anyone would hope for. Morgan points that some wish
fulfillment fictions may not strike readers as such because our contemporary worldview is so
divergent from that of the author. For instance, he cites W. D. Hay’s Three Hundred Years
Hence, which is ultimately a fantasy about white, British imperial dominance after centuries of
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strife. While it would strike a modern reader as vile, the novel was overt wish fulfillment for its
author’s intended audience. There is at best a limited clear audience who would long for
Hodgson’s future, however. He imagines a brutal, scientific-primitive era in which life is
ordered and a bit romantic (to those who crave heroes, damsels in distress, and monsters for man
to conquer), but which is defined by confinement and constant fear. His world is a parallel of
adventure during the dark ages, with a literal emphasis on the darkness of such an era. So, while
The Night Land does not reject wish fulfillment outright, the novel is only the most perfunctory
entry in the wish fulfillment bibliography, balanced by fear and horror.
Hodgson’s world is set so far in the future that serious prediction is off the table (we will
have to check back in a few million years to see how he did.) As established earlier, serious
prediction, dire warning and wish fulfillment the more didactic of the predictive aims Morgan
describes. That is, each of these three predictive types declares something like “it would be
good/bad if x happened,” or “if we aren’t careful/because of our present actions, x will happen.”
Because of our present actions, x will happen.” Hodgson proves hesitant to latch onto anything
so concrete. Morgan’s three remaining moves of predictive fictions—escapism, satire and
philosophical discussion, are all more broadly focused, and come into play in The Night Land.
Owing to the inherent dramatic irony of predictive fiction, the novel is escapist and satirical
essentially by default. Regarding satire, Morgan explains that “[because] all predictions of the
future must relate somehow to the present in which they were written, any changes or
progressions envisaged by their writers are, whether intentionally or not, satirical comments
upon the present” (74). That built-in contrast with the present also gives The Night Land a de
facto escapist component, showing the reader a world that is necessarily alien.
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Of philosophical predictive fiction, Morgan says “[the] idea may be as restricted as a
single scientific theory . . . or it may be an all-embracing philosophy and outlook” (180).
Hodgson’s work embraces the latter. Throughout the novel, Hodgson’s philosophy is one of
overwhelming skepticism towards almost all belief and knowledge outside of immediate
personal experience. Born in 1877 and writing in the early twentieth century, Hodgson’s work is
influenced by the rapidly changing nature of authoritative, concrete knowledge in the west. By
the mid twentieth century, authors like Pynchon or Asimov had accepted a universe beholden to
entropy and a general scientific framework. Hodgson, living on the cusp of two eras, was not so
ready to accept (or reject outright) knowledge emerging in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. Instead, The Night Land often reflects both sides of any piece of definite knowledge.
Whether Hodgson accepts or rejects a rational concept, he leaves the possibility open that
accepted knowledge is incorrect. Throughout the novel, Hodgson avoids committing to
absolutes—absolute history, absolute knowledge, or an absolute end. The narrator does show,
though, absolute confidence in his knowledge of his own experiences. Describing his split
consciousness early on, he tells us,
I waked not to ignorance; but to a full knowledge of those
things which lit the Night Land; even as a man wakes from sleep
each morning, and knows immediately he wakes, the names and
knowledge of the Time which has bred him, and in which he lives.
And the same while, a knowledge I had, as it were sub-conscious,
of this Present—this early life, which now I live so utterly alone.
(17)
Later, contradicting the future’s ancient poet Aesworpth, who spoke of the night land’s monsters
as eternal, he reiterates his “amazement at perceiving, in memory, the unknowable sunshine and
splendour of this age breaking so clear through my hitherto most vague and hazy visions; so that
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the ignorance of, Aesworpth was shouted to me by the things which now I knew” (20). The
narrator’s own perceptions are never in doubt, though most other knowledge is.
Throughout the novel, there are numerous mentions of the Redoubt’s vast libraries, and
nearly as many indications that the record is not fully trusted by either scholars or general
citizens of the redoubt. Concerning, for instance, the existence of the Lesser Redoubt, the
narrator reports that “the libraries were full of those who would look up the olden Records,
which for so long had been forgotten, or taken, as we of this day would say, with a pinch of salt”
(41). Once the Lesser Redoubt’s existence is established, the scholars try to determine its
location. Again, the narrator says that “neither the Records and Histories of the World give us
that knowledge, only that there was general thought among the Students and the Monstruwacans
that it lay between the North-West and the North-East. But no man had any surety” (48). Later,
reflecting in the vast graveyard of the Redoubt, the narrator recalls the “unremembered
generations” of builders “who lived and laboured and died, and seen not the end of their labour”
(66). And in the scope of “lonesome Eternities” (151) of the far-future, even detailed and
accurate records are of no use, because of those who inevitably “build Fancy upon the tellings of
the Records, and make foolish and fantastic that which had groundings in the Truth; and thus is it
ever” (90). As a predictive work, The Night Land adopts a philosophy of skepticism for any
seemingly definite knowledge outside of that which is immediately perceived by the individual.
Hodgson carries the certainty of individual experience to such an extreme that narrator’s
perception is even supernatural, arriving by way of telepathy and unexplained shared
consciousness. The narrator’s telepathy affords him a certainty in knowledge of the Lesser
Redoubt, and his double consciousness shows him the folly of both contemporary and far future
learning. The implication is that, barring supernatural perception resembling divine intervention,

27
accumulated human knowledge is at best limited and temporary, and in most instances probably
just wrong.

The Night Land — The Emerging Vision
A confluence of cultural developments in the mid-to-late 19th century laid the foundation
for the odd vision of The Night Land. New perspectives and trends in western science, religion,
mathematics and literature variously suggested uncertainty, impermanence, dread and
incomprehensibility regarding humanity’s place in the universe. These developments were also
fixated on what I have established as the two apocalyptic impulses—culmination, via the study
and redefinition of ultimate states and long-form history, and cessation, in the forms of both
scientific and spiritual theories about the ultimate fate of the universe. In science, “the
geologist’s discovery of ‘deep time’ extended the life of the universe from thousands past
millions into billions of years” (Morse 40). Existentially, this shift radically redefined the scale
of individual lives as measured against history, while also suggesting the remarkable durability
of the planet. The revelation also revealed how limited human history was compared to
planetary history. Realizing that the earth was thousands of times older than previously realized
must have made time feel infinite, or close enough to infinite to count. Within a few decades,
mathematicians were also fixated on infinity because of the work of Georg Cantor. In the last
decades of the nineteenth century, Cantor began trying to define mathematical infinity by
grouping the set of all numbers into one mathematical unit. This simple move created a tangible
mathematical unit with which mathematicians could begin testing the functions and boundaries
of infinity. The move toward sets also revealed that mathematics allows multiple infinities of
varying size, triggering “some very disturbing paradoxes” which destabilized the seeming
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sturdiness that had been the cornerstone of mathematics for centuries (Chaitin 7). Of course, his
ideas also suggested that infinity—once a purely abstract concept—could be made concrete,
allowing mathematicians to actually study it in definite ways for the first time. Beyond
mathematics, Cantor’s theories suggested not just a single concrete infinity, but infinite infinities.
Like so many other upheavals near the turn of the twentieth century, Cantor’s work was not just
a gradual adjustment of an existing knowledge base, but an unsettling mutation proving how
fragile established certainty could be.
Roughly concurrent with the geologists and mathematicians were broadening the scope
of history and infinity, Darwin’s On the Origin of Species (1859) was popularizing the notion of
evolution in the natural world. If geologists suggested time was practically infinite, Darwin’s
work implied that it also lacked linearity. Though often misunderstood as a mechanism of
ascent, evolution actually implies that, in the long term, life instead is simply a series of neverending lateral changes. The notion of an infinite, non-linear universe is captivating, and implies
endless possibility. But just as this set of discoveries revealed an ancient, constantly evolving
Earth, the discovery of entropy suggested an unavoidable endgame, as energy converted to heat
via physical work could never be recovered. “As early as the mid-nineteenth century, almost
before the ink had dried on the second law of thermodynamics” Joshua Raulerson tells us, “the
long-range implications of physical entropy had begun to sink in among the Victorians” (183184).
Universal “heat death” rapidly gained acceptance as the long-term rational outcome of
energy consumption. Experimental science, once a hopeful force for delivery from ignorance,
was now inspiring dread as it revealed phenomena like entropy and mass extinction. By the late
nineteenth century, the scientific view of the universe was complicated and paradoxical. In one
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sense, the scope of existence ballooned thanks to deep time. However, entropy suggested a
definite, linear endpoint.
As time both expanded and became more finite, early information technologies both
expanded and shrunk the world. Namely, the new scientific revelations coincided with the
emergence of electric telegraphic technologies. By introducing near-instantaneous long-distance
communication, the telegraph, in the words of its contemporaries, threatened to “annihilate space
and time” completely (Sconce 87, Menke 7)8. Meanwhile, Darwin suggested that the notion of
linear directionality was fallacious. Pynchon and Asimov had clearly internalized these seeming
contradictions by the time of their writing, and navigate them in spirited ways. Hodgson,
though, writing in the early twentieth century, is less willing to accept—let alone resolve—these
conflicts, instead presenting a novel that is perpetually skeptical and unsettled.
Donald E. Morse identifies a similar paradox at the intersection of the era’s religious
thought and its broader social mythology. “The work of nineteenth-century historians,” he says,
“reflected their passionate commitment to recording human progress, English supremacy, and
the positive goodness of science” (34). In this sense, the prevailing attitude among colonial
powers was that history was the story of perpetual progress. At the same time, a widespread rise
in eschatological theology (particularly, though not exclusively, in the United States) caused a
spread of doomsday prophecy and apocalyptic religion. Millions of people believed the divine
end was not only guaranteed but would happen soon. Thus, competing narratives emerged. For
some, humanity seemed destined for continual upward progress with no sign of an end. For
others, the time was nigh to prepare for the coming rapture. “Throughout the nineteenth
century,” Morse says, “'reality' became, for many, the widespread belief in Apocalypse joined
with an increasing belief in human progress” (40). These disparate attitudes melded into one
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simultaneous state of cognitive dissonance. The Night Land basks in this unresolved tension. In
its world, human extinction and entropic apocalypse feels imminent—but has felt imminent for
scores of millennia, to no avail. A steady dread hangs over The Night Land, but never resolves.
While the narrative ends with the narrator returning to the Redoubt a hero, the nature of the land
continues, unchanged. Our end is guaranteed, imminent, and impossible.
Meanwhile, British and American horror fiction had reached, in the perspective of
Hodgson’s contemporaries, a sort of end point. As discussed, The Night Land bucks
straightforward genre classification. But in an era before science fiction or weird fiction were
formally established, The Night Land would probably fall in with horror tales and romances.
Edith Birkhead, in her 1921 survey The Tale of Terror, charts the progression of horror and
romance fictions. She claims that by the turn of the century, “[the] limit of human endurance has
been reached—and passed. Emphasis and exaggeration have done their worst. Battle, murder,
and sudden death—even spectres and fiends—can appall no more. If the old thrill is to be
evoked again, the application of more ingenious methods is needed” (157-158). If Hodgson is
part of the horror tradition, he is definitely of the extreme school of horror authors Birkhead
describes here, if not beyond it entirely. Later in the chapter, she laments that readers in the
early twentieth century “miss the vulgar blatancy of an honest, old-fashioned spectre” (184).
Hodgson’s mutated monsters, bizarre setting, telepathic communication, and brutal violence are
as far away from blatant and old-fashioned elements as one can imagine, utterly strange even
today. It is noteworthy that Hodgson is working within a genre that Birkhead thinks had reached
its logical endpoint by the late nineteenth century, and that he pushes his work far beyond that
endpoint. Today, readers sometimes categorize The Night Land as post-apocalyptic—a story that
continues on beyond society’s end. In the same way, the novel itself is determined to defy any
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end of the genre in which it operates, showing how a form can evolve into an unrecognizable,
unclassifiable new thing entirely. Hodgson’s novel is, in a sense, ab-horror—a barelyrecognizable mutation of a narrative mode once mundane, twisted into a new, undefinable form.
In the world of genre, it is the same kind of beast as those that stalk his characters.
We see that Hodgson was writing in an era when the very notion of definite realities must
have felt remarkably unstable. All eras are eras of change, but the late nineteenth century was
laying a baseline view of the rational universe which in many ways is still in operation. Many
people now accept a four billion year old earth, populated by species always in flux according to
randomness and natural selection, as simple fact. Set theory is no longer the frontier of
mathematics, but instead the general building block for theoretical approaches to the infinite.
Universal heat-death is still seen as the logical endpoint of the universe (if not of humanity).
Instant, worldwide communication is not just common, but mundane. In Hodgson’s era, these
conceptions were radical and emergent, reshaping the popular sense of the universe in just a few
decades. And while many of these ideas have since been refined in the century since Hodgson's
time, they now have had a steady presence in the collective consciousness for multiple
generations. These once-radical upheavals are now givens in daily life.
As such, we have collectively had time to build a cultural mythology around these
conceptions, as seen in “Entropy” and “The Last Question.” In Hodgson’s era, these conceptions
—scientific discoveries that both expanded and limited the universe’s life, mathematical theories
that revealed multiple infinities, near-instant trans-continental communication, and so on—were
too uncanny to easily accept. In each case, such advancements seemed to break down established
cognitive frameworks for interpreting the space and time around us.
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The predominant worldview during Hodgson’s lifetime was constantly shifting, often
contradictory, and radically different from that even a half century earlier. As a means of
exploring and processing these changes, Hodgson wrote a novel defined by uncertainty, in which
no definite human knowledge can be trusted beyond that which is immediately perceived by his
narrator, a supernatural hero. Hodgson’s generation watched as truths were overturned one after
another, replaced by new concepts which were held up as equally authoritative as what they were
replacing. Rather than accepting these developments without question, or rejecting them outright
and doubling down on older views, Hodgson reacts with a pervasive skepticism toward any
definite truth, outside of that which he can immediately know. If his burnt-out sun suggests
acceptance of entropy, he undercuts it with a world that carries on without sunlight. If his abhuman mutant monsters accept (however grimly) a belief in human evolution, his throngs of
traditionally human millions suggest evolution can halt. Hodgson routinely extrapolates both
viewpoints of the new cultural phenomena he encountered, ultimately suggesting that no
knowledge is certain, that no viewpoint is definitive, and that the larger universe will never be
truly understood. The apocalypse is a mechanism of revelation—an ultimate state that reveals
truths and absolute natures of the living and their world. It is a culminating societal moment, a
collective movement “toward the light,” which narratively postulates our true natures. At every
turn, Hodgson portrays but denies the mechanisms of apocalypse, and he ultimately denies the
ability of humanity to discover or reveal meaningful, absolute truths about an end. All that is
certain, he decides, is the human will to carry on.

33
Chapter II – Asimov & Pynchon: The Center is Missing
Perhaps every half-century, no matter how you slice it, reshapes the world in immense
ways, depending on what is singled out for inspection. That said, the not-quite-fifty years
between The Night Land and Isaac Asimov’s 1956 “The Last Question” (1956) was monumental.
That window produced, among other things, two world wars and the explosion of information
technologies that continues to define contemporary life. For instance: Around The Night Land’s
1912 publication, the company that would become IBM had just formed and was making hightech devices like time clocks, scales, and meat slicers (Campbell-Kelly, Aspray 37-39). By “The
Last Question,” IBM had introduced the hard drive and the first computer capable of
synthesizing speech (IBM), and early supercomputers were only five years off (Swedin, Ferro
57). As Lisa Vox notes, “[u]ntil World War I, most Americans were not familiar with the term
‘technology’ as we use it—the mechanical objects produced by scientific knowledge and
engineering techniques” (19). Within a half century, Asimov was already hypothesizing
uploaded consciousnesses and singularity, and advanced computing was becoming part of
everyday reality for millions of people worldwide. A drastic change in popular mindset,
especially as it related scientific understanding, was inevitable. And with that change, some
authors, including Asimov, found ways to dramatize the entropic apocalypse.
“The Last Question” is one example of how changes in technology and scientific
understanding allowed an author to move past the apocalyptic world that never really ends
toward a universe that completes its circuit. I argue that a shift in scientific consciousness—from
a model based on systems to a model based on the network—allowed Asimov’s scientificallyinclined imagination to write about non-human subjects and plots. In The Night Land, for all its
far-future oddity, Hodgson’s subject is actually a typical romantic hero, and the plot is a standard
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damsel-in-distress rescue mission. An entropic universe, as much as the story seems to be
“about” it, is more setting than focus. Like so much post-apocalyptic fiction, apocalyptic
elements color the tale, but do not present a new kind of narrative. In “The Last Question,”
though, the subject is not a hero but is the universe itself, and the plot is entropy, not a human
story told in the face of entropy. Asimov tells stories of people in “The Last Question,” but they
operate essentially as side characters for as the universe.
Asimov tells his story by following two concepts, entropy and computational progress,
toward their most distant reaches. Across trillions of years, entropy and technology move way
from abstraction and speculation toward being immediate realities. In Asimov’s mind, reckoning
must come, and he aims to show it. The two eventualities stare each other down throughout the
story, forcing the reader to wonder which will blink first, only for Asimov to unite the two in the
The tension begins in 2061, when two engineers of Multivac, a vast supercomputer
already complex beyond human comprehension, begin speculating about technology’s limits.
Multivac’s artificial intelligence has engineered a way to harness the sun’s power for unlimited
free energy, which not only can power earth, but which can fuel long-distance spacecraft,
unlocking the whole galaxy for human exploration. After a public celebration of the
announcement, the engineers, drunk, contemplate the implications. “‘It’s amazing if you think of
it,’” says the engineer Adell, “All the energy we could possibly ever use for free . . . forever and
ever’” (1-2). Lupov, a contrarian literalist, counters “Not forever” (2). Though it will last
billions of years, the sun is a limited resource. So, too, are all stars in the universe, even if they
outlive our sun a dozen times over. “[G]ive us a trillion years,” Lupov says, “and everything will
be dark. Entropy has to increase to maximum, that’s all” (2).
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Stirred by this dilemma, the two turn to Multivac. Multivac, by 2061, has taken on the
job of solving problems too large or too complex for humanity to handle. While reconciling that
step could perhaps be the entire plot for a post-apocalyptic story, as in the cyberpunk genre or the
Terminator series, Asimov uses that step as the beginning, which he will quickly breeze by. Ever
the idealist, Asimov recognizes the vast potential for both human and non-human advancement
afforded by the rise of computer technology. He is also rationalist, thought, and sees that
entropy ensures progress cannot truly be infinite, even if it may appear so against limited human
consciousness. Asimov brings this awareness to life in Adell and Lupov’s conversation about
Multivac. The engineers, through code, ask the machine some variation of “How can the net
amount of entropy of the universe be massively decreased?” (3). Multivac computes and gives
the answer that become the refrain of the story: “INSUFFICIENT DATA FOR A
MEANINGFUL ANSWER” (3). The two are unsettled and retreat, and then forget the incident
in the haze of their hangovers.
At this point in the story, Asimov is pointing toward important features that separate his
apocalyptic work from one like Hodgson’s, even if both are concerned with entropy. By the
beginning of his story, technology has already taken on a role separate from humanity. Whereas
even the most advanced computers of Asimov’s day were tools for human use (and crude by
today’s standards), Multivac is established in the first scene as its own, non-human character via
the scientists attempt at conversation with it. Though the scene is not rendered in especially
dramatic fashion, Asimov’s characters are having an encounter with what Amitav Ghosh pegs as
the uncanny.
As is the focus of his study, Ghosh speaks of the uncanny in climate change. Ghosh says
uncanniness is generally that “something” we feel in extreme or dreadful circumstances, the
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factor that rattles us. It comes from a recognition of “something we had turned away from: that is
to say, the presence and proximity of nonhuman interlocutors” (30). Ghosh speculates that the
nonhuman uncanny of climate change is different from “[the] ghosts of literary fiction,”
acceptable in serious fiction because they are “projections of humans, who were once alive” (32).
Meanwhile, the environmental uncanny is separate “because it pertains to nonhuman forces and
beings” though it “[is] animated and cultivated by human actions” (32). By Ghosh’s definition,
Multivac would seem of an ilk with the environmental uncanny. A human creation, it becomes a
nonhuman force which, via its energy harvesting technology, shapes future human experience.
However, Asimov’s story is not human-focused. Ghosh’s definition, like most fiction, depends
on the centrality of humans characters and concerns. As “The Last Question” advances, it
becomes clear that the fate of the universe is related to, but separate from, the fate of humanity.
After the last question is asked for the first time, the story flashes forward unspecified
thousands of years in the future, into an era of everyday planetary travel. Computer technology
has passed multiple stages: Multivac first had grown to planet-size “Planetary ACs,” until
molecular components reduced those ACs to a portable, half-spaceship size, still solar powered.
Phase two of the story introduces a family migrating from one planet to another aboard a
spaceship with an on-board AC. The children, inquiring about the Microvac’s power source, also
learn about entropy and the certain death of stars. The revelation that stars die and entropy
increases awakens the same fear of finite resources, and thus finite time, that faced the children’s
counterparts in 2061. To calm the children, their father asks Microvac how to “‘turn the stars on
again’” (4). He tells the children the computer has said it will take care of things when the time
comes, but its true answer was the same as in 2061: “INSUFFICIENT DATA FOR A
MEANINGFUL ANSWER” (4).
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In this parallel episode, Asimov is displaying a kind of networked consciousness that sets
his storytelling approach, as well as his worldview, apart from that of Hodgson or so many
others. We again see that the humans characters in the story are serving their role in about
entropy and technology. We also see that this set of human characters, though unphased by
interplanetary travel and computation beyond the imaginations of Multivac’s creators, are
essentially non-distinct from human characters in wildly different eras and circumstances.
Human characters in the story are separate but interchangeable units (to borrow a term from Ian
Bo of contemplation, allowing the AC to grapple with the question but not responsible for
“moving” the story along. Asimov this point of interchangeability home with the naming of
characters in this second episode. The parents are Jerrodd and Jerrodine, the children both
Jerrodette, I and II. For Hodgson’s hero, his distinctness was essential to his character and the
plot overall. Only he had the power, instincts, knowledge, and abilities to contact the Lesser
Redoubt, traverse the Night Land, and save his true love. The deeper we get save into Asimov’s
story, the more we see that human individuality is inessential for telling this tale.
The story next jumps twenty-two thousand years. The galaxy, because of growth
potential provided by ACs, is five years away from being full, and humanity (now immortal) is
consuming two “sunpower units” yearly for energy. Far-future humans MQ-17J and VJ-23X
contemplate a map of the cosmos. MQ-17J asks the Galactic AC, now a pocket-sized unit, if
entropy can be reversed. The answer, of course, is the same. The cycle continues. First, humanity
transcends the body and occupies hyperspace consciousness, asking the question to a Universal
AC. Then, humanity transcends individual consciousness and becomes one mind, asking the
question to a Cosmic AC. Ten trillion years hence, once all “stars and Galaxies [haved] died and

38
stuffed out” (9), the final human mind asks AC the question. There is still no answer, and the
human mind fuses with AC in hyperspace.
Having exhausted all delays, the Asimov makes the apocalyptic turn: “Matter and energy
had ended and with it space and time. Even AC existed only for the sake of that last question that
it never answered” (9). After a timeless interval (because even that force has reached its end),
AC learns the answer, but with no one to reveal it to. It’s stumped. Finally, AC settles on the
method, and says “LET THERE BE LIGHT,” and there is light. Asimov’s apocalyptic vision, in
“The Last Question,” is one of cyclical cosmic renewal. As entropy increases, the potential for
work is gradually lost, until a system reaches total static equilibrium. Asimov equates the fact of
entropy increase with technology’s ascending capacity for more output with less energy
consumption and physical space. Though entropy’s increase theoretically hampers the potential
for high-powered work, computer technology consistently does more with less.

Foucault & Bogost: Transcending the System
Asimov’s approach is wide-ranging. In telling a story across trillions of years, he marries
geologic time, entropy, and technological singularity to imagine an ouroboric
creation/destruction cycle that both transcends and creates the universe. In doing so, he
challenges many of the dichotomies—creation vs destruction; past vs. future; science vs.
religion; progress vs. oblivion—that made an entropic apocalypse so difficult to portray for
Hodgson. Asimov’s story is driven at the beginning by human characters. By the end of the
story, sentient computation at (or beyond) a universal scale have taken on the role of a main
character—and we realize computation was the main character all along. This transition is both
functional and symbolic. Asimov saw a world of rapidly expanding computational
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sophistication, and could picture no endgame that did not end with machine surpassing mankind
as its power grew. At the same time, he needed a style of storytelling appropriate to a
computational, networked model—if computers surpassed humans, the logic of computation
should guide the story. In essence, Asimov leaves behind the paradigm of taxonomic thought
that, according to Foucault, defined human scientific thought after the Enlightenment, in favor of
a networked model spurred by computational models.
Taxonomy thrives on dichotomies. Within a taxonomy, all things can (and must) be
sorted based first on similarities, then by differences. And sorting is the key. Foucault, in The
Archaeology of Knowledge, says that such thinking “individualizes and describes discursive
formations,” which are the basis for sorting, and thus thinking, in the era of biology. To sort
things out, and to distinguish each thing as unique and thus categorizable (and thus
understandable), taxonomy “must compare them, oppose them to one another in the simultaneity
in which they are presented, distinguish them from those that do not belong to the same timescale, relate them, on the basis of their specificity, to the non-discursive practices that surround
them and serve as a general element for them” (157). In taxonomic thinking (which Ian Bogost
calls systems thinking), knowledge is a product of discourse which necessarily categorizes
through dichotomous analysis.
Systems thinking tends to conflate knowledge with understanding. If discursive systems
can reveal the underlying system guiding experiences, that system can reveal a unifying
knowledge. Ian Bogost explains that “[systems] operations are . . . totalizing structures that seek
to explicate a phenomenon, behavior, or state in its entirety.” The sense in much inquiry is that
entirety itself is based in one “initial state” in which “chaotic systems are deterministic, even if
unpredictable” (93). Systems are, in a sense, a branch of what Kermode calls “concord
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fictions”—structural narratives built to “cover . . . disquieting gaps [and] intervals in the human
experience” (62). That is not to say concord fictions are not sometimes based in fact. Rather,
they offer ways for objective facts or observations to be added to the human knowledge base
without changing assumptions which are the foundation for that base.
Kermode bases his idea in the wave-particle duality of quantum mechanics. Quantum
mechanics observed that light, and by extension any quantum, functions as both wave and
particle—in conflict with classical physics. Kermode noted that many scientists were hesitant to
accepting a “natural discontinuity” in systems, in which “propositions may even yet be true and
false at the same time” (60, 62). Heisenberg’s “special case” approach to the problem was thus a
significant concord fiction of twentieth-century thought (60). In the special case interpretation,
“classical mechanics,” which had been the foundation of inquiry for centuries, “was a special
case of quantum mechanics,” rather than a separate (or a false) system. This concord fiction fit
conflicting models together in one system that simply made room for both, rather than
challenging the flaws of systems models themselves as conceptual models. Such a move is
essential in systems thinking, because, as Bogost claims, “systems seek to explain all things via
an unalienable order” (6).
The end goal in this model is to sort all things into categories, sub-categories, sub-subcategories and so on until each thing is distinct and separate from all others. In The Order of
Things, Foucault describes these continuous sub-categories as “unencumbered spaces in which
things are juxtaposed,” (131) suggesting an ultimate model of one giant table on which all things
are continuously subdivided into their own boxes. Essentially, total understanding could come
from a glimpse at the divine spreadsheet. In such a model, "beginning” and “end” could not be
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more distinct. On the divine spreadsheet, existence is the broad, universal category, underneath
which all categories subdivide. Any end to existence is incompatible with the model.
A network model is related to, but opposed to, a system model, which finds its meaning
and functionality in an orderly sorting of all things to understand the relationships between—and
characters of—all things. A network consists of the same things as systems, be they people,
actions, ideas, and so on (in Ian Bogost’s terms, these various things are called units). In the
network model, these units both operate independently of one another and build various totalities
that can include, overlap with, or contradict other systems and totalities. Systems instead see a
totalities within which other things play a part.
In a system, for example, smaller flora and fauna are part of larger families and a larger
ecosystem. Each living thing is tied together to give life to the biome as a whole. Clear-cut a
forest, for instance, and animals will die or relocate, causing further loss of species that made the
ecosystem function. The ecosystem is a totality in which the smaller things are subsumed by the
larger one. By removing one component, the totality suffers. In such a model, thought “climbs
the ladder” easily, and focused shifts to “the big picture.” That is how environmentalists see
clear-cutting and implore others to “save the rainforest” or, even better, “save the Earth.” The
scalability of the issue becomes the issue, because the larger totalities carry the most weight in a
system.
In Bogost’s networked unit operations, those “larger” and “smaller” tags fall away, or at
least lose their primacy. Like an ecosystem, an insect within it consists of components—in the
bug’s case, cells, limbs, instincts, an exoskeleton, etc.—that together compose a living entity.
The cell within is also a living entity composed of parts. The colony of ants is a living entity
composed of parts. The colonies of ants are each components in the living entity of the
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ecosystem. And so on. The move of unit operations, or the networked consciousness, is to not
scale these entities. Each entity described—the cell, the insect, the colony, the ecosystem—can
be viewed as a unit of the phenomenon of composition. Each unit is equally representative of this
phenomenon, and each can be studied alone or together to better understand it.
Again, while systems thinking is a viable model for generating knowledge, the very
scalability which defines it can sometimes impede the understanding of that knowledge. To
return to “save the Earth” appeals in environmentalism, granting primacy to the upper-reaches of
the global system may hurt the appeal. Perhaps it sounds simplistic, but people resistant to “save
the Earth” arguments may look around and see, well, the Earth, still intact, seemingly unchanged
on any existential level. In truth, environmental destruction, like climate catastrophe itself, is a
network of changes. These changes are neither uniform nor simultaneous. When Paradise,
California burns down, or when counties of farmland are flooded away, or when a reservoir
dries, or when glacier breaks apart and melts, each event can be framed as a solitary event and a
freak occurrence when the encompassing system are so large their nature seems unchanged.
What Asimov presents instead, when he wraps the end and beginning of time together as
the same moment, is a kind of mission statement for the network model of thought. In fact,
Asimov dramatizes the growth of a computer network, called the AC (eventually the galactic AC
and the universal AC) as a central component of his story. In tandem, he portrays the movement
of life toward a unified, networked consciousness with each progressive societal iteration. New
forms of living being and new social structures are the definition of what would be separate in a
taxonomy—though sharing traits and background, each iteration is so wholly new and distinct as
to not be mistaken for the others. Eventually technology, consciousness, and spacetime unify.
One realizes, then, that this unification is not the end on a linear scale, but also the beginning.
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Thus, unification is not the end point of the story, but an inborn component from the beginning
and throughout the duration. Asimov seems to argue that networking is not just a technological
principle, but a universal principle.

Where the Wind Don’t Blow — “Entropy” and the Full Vision
Is Asimov’s universal reset a New Jerusalem? If the next world is simply this one again,
is it a next world at all? Asimov leaves such questions open, perhaps not really addressing them
at all. His aim seems more to break down the dichotomy of divine versus worldly itself. Just as
he equated sentient technology with the sentient mind, or the future with the present, the divine
and the worldly are both units of creative potential. The difference between them, to Asimov, is
irrelevant, if it is even there at all.
Thomas Pynchon has no specific interest in bridging such a divide. His 1960 story
“Entropy” considers the ramifications of a truly ambivalent entropic apocalypse. Asimov’s
human characters were curious, contemplative, and often in awe of the universe. Most of
Pynchon’s “Entropy” characters are aimless and hedonistic, showing no awareness of or reaction
to an encroaching apocalypse. For these characters the end—which arrives in 1957 rather than
beyond the reach is sudden and carries no specific significance. However, the two characters
who are aware of the end are terrified, but through their horror achieve a sublime state, though
such transcendence affords them no more transcendent fate. Intertwining two narratives,
Pynchon shows that the end may have meaning for individuals, but only if that meaning is
ascribed to it by those who meet it. Whether meaningful or meaningless, noticed or ignored,
entropy, an unstoppable constant in our universe, will reach a maximum and halt all things
indifferently.
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The story is set in February, 1957, on two floors of a Washington, D.C. apartment
house. Downstairs, 50s hipster Meatball Mulligan is throwing a multi-day “lease-breaking party”
(277) for a motley crew, including jazz musicians, college students, beltway professionals, and
Navy officers. Upstairs, Callisto and Aubade, a couple, monitor the weather from their
apartment, which they have converted to miniature hothouse. Pynchon establishes a chaotic tone
early, filling the story with abundant narrative threads that can never resolve, overcrowding his
story with tension, and steadily building a sense of dread. He also establishes parallel groups of
characters, as Asimov did, with wide-ranging motives and concerns who ultimately occupy the
same human space in the story of apocalypse.
The story opens, “Downstairs, Meatball Mulligan's lease-breaking party was moving
into its fortieth hour. On the kitchen floor, amid a litter of empty champagne fifths, were Sandor
Rojas and three friends . . . staying awake on Heidsieck and benzedrine pills" (277). For two
pages, the party’s chaos grows. The focus then turns to Callisto’s apartment. The noise
downstairs wakes him, and he holds the ailing bird on his chest. “He wondered how many more
nights he would have to give it warmth before it was well again. He had been holding the bird
like this for three days: it was the only way he knew to restore its health” (279). Callisto’s bird is
near death from the outset, and its heartbeat weakens from scene to scene.
We soon learn, via Aubade, that the temperature has remained a constant 37˚ Fahrenheit
for three days, about the same time span as Meatball’s party. While the characters in Meatball’s
plot are unaware of this oddity (and would pay no mind if they knew), Callisto is monitoring the
event obsessively. "The cosmologists,” the narrator says “had predicted an eventual heat-death
for the universe (something like Limbo: form and motion abolished, heat-energy identical at
every point); the meteorologists, day-to-day, staved it off by contradicting with a reassuring

45
array of varied temperatures” (280). In a sense, Pynchon is presenting a metaphor for reading his
own story via the tension between cosmologists and meteorologists. In the cosmologist’s sense,
entropic halting would be a normal event, but meteorologists, focused on day-to-day life on a
much smaller scale, would see such an event as extraordinary and implausible.
That dichotomy of interpretive framing brings us back to Amitav Ghosh. The tension in framing
the unchanging weather aligns with the tension Ghosh explores between genre fiction and
serious literary fiction in portraying climate change. While Gosh is concerned with more recent
fiction than “Entropy,” his understanding of genre conflict is prescient. The Anthropocene, he
says,“consists of phenomena that were long ago expelled from the territory of the novel—forces
of unthinkable magnitude that create unbearably intimate connections over vast gaps in time and
space” (63). Hodgson, Asimov, and Pynchon were writing about time and entropy as such
phenomena. And while Hodgson was writing wildly speculative fiction and Asimov was writing
for branded science-fiction publications, Pynchon’s genre tag is more difficult. Is he writing
science fiction in “Entropy”?
Eric Rabkin would seem to say so. His understanding of science fiction as a genre, while
one definition of many, is instructive. In his 1979 book The Fantastic in Literature, Rabkin says
the genre kicks in when “habits of mind and their associated bodies of knowledge determine the
outcome of events, regardless of which science most obviously informs the narrative world”
(121). “Entropy” is clearly focused on how the mind handles scientific knowledge and how the
body of scientific understanding should influence narrative. But his world is not fantastical in the
sense of exotic technologies, alien locales, anthropomorphized technology, or any noteworthy
tropes of science fiction as a genre. Instead, with “Entropy,” Pynchon creates tension by asking
readers if universal extinction is extraordinary or in-fact mundane. Such an event affects the
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totality of existence and necessarily only happens once, like a spectacular cataclysm, but is also
as natural as a soft breeze in spring. It is impossible to tell a realistic story without implied
scientific understanding and consideration, as such a knowledge base has informed the core of
society for centuries. So where is the threshold between scientific consideration that pushes us
into sci-fi, and scientific consideration that grounds the everyday?
The world of “Entropy” is recognizable, ordered, and rational—it does not seem different
than our own. But by adding one odd element—a persistent 37˚ temperature—Pynchon gives
the story an uncanny undercurrent, which is essential to both science fiction and apocalyptic
literature. What’s more, Rabkin says “a good work of science fiction makes only one
assumption about its narrative world that violates our knowledge about our own world and then
extrapolates the whole narrative world from that difference” (121). Pynchon does just that.
Pynchon’s readers know entropy is a real phenomenon, but it should not shut down our universe
for trillions of years. In “Entropy,” however, heat death, somehow, is right on our doorstep.
Regardless of genre, Pynchon uses a science-fiction to create uncanny dread which carries
throughout his story. Having established this tension, Pynchon then shifts his focus back
downstairs. The revelers grow increasingly disordered, failing to advance any kind of plotted
action, while our uneasy curiosity about the static temperature, and its potentially entropic
nature, lingers.
Pynchon’s characters have disparate concerns and few goals. The downstairs guests
pursue only pleasure, unconcerned with any disorder they leave in their wake. Some guests
crash on couches or pass out in the bathroom, while others take uppers to stay awake, talking
jazz and getting high. One character, Saul, arrives unannounced through the window, the first in
a wave of uninvited guests. These are not people, the narrator tells us, who typically accomplish
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their goals. Pynchon describes some guests as would-be expats who haunt DC, “[talking] every
time they met you about how someday they were going over to Europe for real but right now it
seemed they were working for the government” (278). These are in-the-moment characters,
whose focus on temporary satisfaction stifles personal or collective growth. Their motivations
are different: Saul is fleeing a fight with his wife, the Navy men (who burst in like it’s a military
raid) are looking for a brothel, and most just want to get wasted and be wherever the party is.
Collectively, they seem temporary pleasures. Thus, the party is disorganized and destructive,
and each new guest’s arrival further destabilizes the situation.
Callisto’s goals are more definite than those of his downstairs counterparts. Unlike the
partiers, who are at peace with disorder and self-destruction, Callisto makes every effort to rid
his life of those properties. In contempt of chaos, he has spent seven years working with Aubade
to perfect an intra-apartment ecosystem, complete with both plant and animal life, in a
meticulously controlled climate. While Callisto fears stasis outside, he cultivates balance within
his living space. The apartment is "a tiny enclave of regularity in the city's chaos, alien to the
vagaries of the weather, of national politics, of any civil disorder” (279). The couple does not
even leave their apartment anymore, afraid it would alter the order that keeps their closed system
running. They have succeeded in their goal of creating a habitable, balanced living space amid
the chaos of the city. Having done so, Callisto endeavors to save the bird, and maintain an
atmosphere of life in the habitat.
“Entropy” does not set up a large-scale cultural culmination in the way we might expect
from apocalyptic fiction, but Pynchon employs a dynamic to show us what personal culmination
could look like in an apocalyptic setting. Writing in a postmodern style, it’s not surprising to see
Pynchon fracturing the group dynamic of apocalypse, transforming it into a confrontation with
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the self. Callisto and Aubade afford a view of characters who recognize the apocalypse
approaching, who must fear it or try to accept it. Meatball’s partiers do not see the end coming,
and thus spend their last moments idly, drinking and arguing as the end creeps up on them. In a
culture of individualism, the nature of culmination is transformed to personal experience. For
the aware, culmination may be an ultimate understanding of the ambivalence of the universe.
For the unaware, culmination may instead be a sudden halt without conscious individual
meaning. “Entropy” show readers how each may come to be, and readers are left to wonder
which model of culmination may someday prove more universal.
And even though short-term individual pleasure is the goal for most of the story’s
characters, there are still discussions of collective cultural progress. After all, the entropic
exterminating force in “Entropy” is deceptively subtle—there’s no hulking comet hurtling
through space toward earth or escalating nuclear war. The world has had, it seems, a three-day
warning, and not everyone has even noticed. So, progress soldiers on, even if the micro view
does not reveal a society overall building toward a crescendo of collective group achievement
(i.e. an attempt at utopia). Saul, the guest who earlier came in through the second story window,
discusses MUFFET, the “‘the Multi-unit factorial field electronic tabulator’" with Meatball at the
party. He says his wife “‘has been reading science fiction again. That and Scientific American.
It seems she is, as we say, bugged at this idea of computers acting like people. I made the
mistake of saying you can just as well turn that around, and talk about human behavior like a
program fed into an IBM machine’” (285). Saul’s reference is timely. Published in 1960,
“Entropy” is from an era when stories about the merging of man and machine—and the loss of
humanity in the process—were becoming a cornerstone of the science fiction genre. Authors
latched onto this idea and used it to presage man’s salvation or downfall. Rather than go that
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route, Pynchon uses the conversation to introduce further entropic concepts, such as signal-tonoise ratio and informational entropy. The focus on informational entropy is appropriate, as
“none of the characters in Pynchon's story demonstrate any sustained capacity to engage in
dialogue” (Seed 147). Importantly, this discussion also merges notions of information
technology and the apocalypse.
There is a disconnect between where the conversation starts and where it ends up. Saul’s
commentary on MUFFET introduces his discussion of signal loss1, but the topics are not
explicitly related. The “idea of computers acting like people,” about which his wife is “bugged,”
reminds the reader that society is on the verge of revolutionary technological breakthroughs, the
kind that could substantially alter human life. Signal loss, meanwhile, emphasizes the loss of
meaning between “input” (motivation) and “output” (action) for many of the stories characters.
In the conversation, Pynchon highlights the disconnect between cultural advancement and
personal achievement. Even as American technology progresses, people within Pynchon’s
America feel no connection to the progress. Of course, the entire conversation will be moot, as
there are only a few hours until universal entropy draws human (and universal) action to a close2.
The story’s dramatic tension depends on apocalyptic ironies, as the narrative itself only
has small suggestions of plots. The big plot-action is Callisto’s attempt to save the bird’s life,
but even that only requires him to lie still with it and feel its heartbeat. Beyond that, the conflicts
driving the mini-plots include: Meatball trying to find a mixer for a drink, a girl looking for a
good place to pass out, and the Navy men killing the party’s vibe. The apocalypse will cut off
these small conflicts and any larger attempts at progress with equal ambivalence. Late in the
story, the jazz quartet begins playing in through their set in pantomime (even starting over after
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false starts), suggesting human actions and goals in Pynchon’s universe are something like
shadow boxing—we are simply punching the air while entropy takes its toll.
We only see entropy take over in the Callisto plot, at which point the story concludes.
David Seed proposes, then, that the party downstairs is a foil to the entropy taking place upstairs
(page citation). Near the end of the story, Meatball begins reigning the situation in. He “figured
there were only two ways he could cope [with the party]: (a) lock himself in the closet and
maybe eventually they would all go away, or (b) try to calm everybody down, one by one . . . So
he decided to try and keep his lease-breaking party from deteriorating into total chaos,” (291)
and began putting out the various fires the party had started. According to Seed, “[the] very fact
that Mulligan can choose to restore order and does so, contradicts a superficial fatalism which
the notion of entropy might create” (146). In contrast, I posit that, rather than undercutting the
“superficial fatalism” of entropy, Pynchon is playing on a common misunderstanding of entropy
to add another level of irony here, which indeed adds to the story’s fatalism.
The notion that entropy equates to disorderliness arises from a fluke in the wording of its
early observers. Craig Callender explains, “the canonical example [of entropy is] of a gas
confined by a partition to a section of a container. Remove the partition. In a short span of time,
the gas will relax to equilibrium: that is, it will spread evenly throughout the box, possessing a
uniform pressure and temperature” (349). This exchange is best described as dispersal. One
component of dispersal is the equalizing of temperature between the two gasses. As the lower
temperature gas equalizes, its molecular velocity increases. Ludwig Bolzmann, an influential
19th century physicist who studied entropy, described this increased velocity as “disorder,”
which was simply one part of the entropic process. The wording stuck to the discourse of
entropy, even if the its connotations were misleading. It has since been said that the “most
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egregious errors in the past century of associating entropy with disorder have occurred simply
because disorder is a common language word with non-scientific connotations” (Lambert 189).
So, Meatball is not acting against entropy. Instead, by countering the “total chaos,” he is
actually moving the party toward a state of balance, or equilibrium, which mirrors the actual
entropic process. Meatball spends the end of the party’s second day mellowing everyone out,
resolving the tension in the system. “This is what he did until nightfall,” Pynchon says, “when
most of the revelers had passed out and the party trembled on the threshold of its third day” (291292). The party, which had been dynamic and alive, is resolved to a calmer, balanced state, one
in which most people are sleeping. In other words, he has created a situation wherein the
disparate guests—who once had arrived in a staggered order, and were each in a different stage
of the partying “process”— have reached consistent “velocity.” Meatball isn’t reversing or
denying entropy. Meatball is entropy’s agent, accelerating its path toward final stasis. This scene
is the end of the downstairs plot, and immediately precedes the entropic conclusion of the
upstairs plot. Meatball and Callisto, Pynchon shows us, are both moving the systems of their
apartments toward equilibrium, symbolically participating in entropy’s inevitable creep.
And what reason would Pynchon have to undercut the fatalism of entropy? Entropy is an
empirically suggested endgame for the universe. Scientific frameworks accept that, rationally,
the universe is a system that will eventually conclude. As such, a secular apocalyptic framework
must explore the apocalypse unflinchingly. Barring humanity’s destructive intervention, the end
must eventually arrive via universal equilibrium of entropy, whether or not humanity expects,
welcomes or fears it. Seed may say Pynchon avoids fatalism to rid the story of “gloomy
fatalism” (137), but a rational, secular apocalyptic story has neither a reason nor an option to
look away from or to soften the blow of an entropic end. Pynchon is of a wave of growing
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[[networked]] thought. The ending is not only “baked into” the beginning in a networked
consciousness, but the end is not even a discreet state. Rather, beginning, middle, and end are all
equally parts of the same entity that is existence (and nonexistence).
This does not mean Pynchon himself personally denies the value of hope or human
achievement or whatever Seed wants him to not be doing. But his story is aware of apocalyptic
frameworks, and through it he actively wonders what one may look like in a secular culture
guided by hedonistic utilitarianism. So, with no guiding collective principle, there is no
culmination of human achievement, and entropy creeps up in its time to conclude human
activity. The story is gloomy because Pynchon’s characterization and plotting is so recognizable
and realistic, engaging a palpable dread of the end. Pynchon’s “Entropy” shows that end with
humor and irony, but without obfuscation or denial.
"Entropy” portrays an ambivalent apocalypse. For most in Pynchon’s world, the end is
unceremonious. People in this apocalypse are cut off mid-sentence, so to speak, unaware of the
end they suddenly encountered. Meatball’s plot doesn’t end; one can imagine his guests passed
out on couches for eternity. For a select few, like Callisto and Aubade, the encroaching end is
the root of a transcendent horror. Callisto and Aubade see the moment approaching and
understand its nature. The description of their awareness conveys a sense of the absolute:
absolute stillness, absolute calm, and absolute end—life’s symphony resolving.
[Callisto] sank back, terrified. [Aubade] stood a moment more,
irresolute; she had sensed his obsession long ago, realized
somehow that the constant 37 was now decisive. Suddenly then,
as if seeing the single and unavoidable conclusion to all this she
moved swiftly to the window before Callisto could speak; tore
away the drapes and smashed out the glass with two exquisite
hands which came away bleeding and glistening with splinters;
and turned to face the man on the bed and wait with him until the
moment of equilibrium was reached, when 37 degrees Fahrenheit
should prevail both outside and inside, and forever, and the
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hovering, curious dominant of their separate lives should resolve
into a tonic of darkness and the final absence of all motion (292).
The moment evokes terror and a final outburst, but also the sublime moment of
comprehension. Their end is reminiscent of what David Edward Shaner, evoking Kenji
Nishitani, calls “absolute nihilism,” confronting “the principles of selflessness [and]
impermanence . . . and a perspective of non-discriminating experience” (115). Pynchon equates
the “darkness” and “final absence of motion” with the tonic of a composition, the final note on
which the piece resolves. The final step into absence isn’t loss—it is resolution. The story of
entropy, we see, is not ultimately a human story, but a story of the universe. In making this
distinction, Pynchon is able to introduce a tangible apocalypse that does not deny the fact of an
end. The end hits on its own terms both for those who see it coming and those who do not. And
the end—non-existence—is not in conflict with existence itself. Ending is simply one unit of
change within the history of a universe, on the same field as a universal beginning in the big
bang, or each of the infinite moments of expansion in between. Pynchon’s final moment of
entropy brings the “separate lives” in the story together, indicative of the universal move toward
equilibrium which entropy ensures. Humans are like any other units of matter in the universe, all
facing end through equilibrium in the same way. Pynchon’s characters inhabit a universe of
disconnected individuals, each looking for some kind of fulfilled identity, but each subject to the
same forces and timescale as one another. Culmination of their experiences, then, comes in the
form of equilibrium found in universal cessation. Pynchon shows how the indifferent, entropic
apocalypse can not only be portrayed in fiction, but can be shown as a force of harmonious
resolution that treats all objects in the universe as equal entities.
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Conclusion – Fireworks and Hurricanes
In 2015, Richard Grusin edited The Nonhuman Turn, a collection of “recent and current
critical, theoretical, and philosophical approaches to the humanities and social
sciences…engaged in decentering the human” (vii). As humanity sprints full-speed toward selfprescribed climate catastrophe, and perhaps broad annihilation, it seems the twenty-first century
condition has awakened cultural impulses to examine the nonhuman, and even non-corporeal,
forces or worlds that exist in the same universe. As Ian Bogost asks in The Nonhuman Turn,
“[would] it really be so daft to admit that the world is simply full of interesting, curious things,
all living their own alien lives, bumping and jostling about, engulfing and destroying one other
every one of them as secretive and withdrawn as any other?" ("The Aesthetics of Philosophical
Carpentry” 87).
Bogost’s proposition is interesting in that it does not erase the human experience—
concepts like living, being interested, curiosity, and so on are not exclusively human but are
deeply human regardless— but rather re-frames the human experience as part of the experience,
a conglomeration of individual existences and non-existences and events and non-events that
characterize a de-centered, networked approach to existential interpretation and experience.
Importantly, networked consciousness does not focus on classifying things through separation as
in a discursive formation, but considers how things are alike and different simultaneously. In
Bogost’s unit operations approach to networked interrelations, birth and death are not necessarily
opposites, but rather units of what one may call transition, as each is a liminal phase that a living
thing passes through. Even existence and non-existence themselves case opposition, becoming
two units of what may be called existential possibility.
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In the discursive taxonomy described so often by Foucault, the end game of scientific
study is categorization—finding the one true classification of each thing. “[A] grid,” he says,
“can be laid out over the entire vegetable or animal kingdom. Each group can be given a name
. . . Its complete name will cross the entire network of characters that one has established, right
up to the largest classifications of all” (The Order of Things 141). Species emerged from such
categorization and so do castes, genres, and other units of isolation. The move is ultimately to
define similarities and differences in a linear way, with differences as the most defining
characteristics. Foucault argues that such formations were the basis for the episteme of scientific
thought following the era of the natural history. One is not surprised, then, that scientifically
aware fiction from the taxonomic episteme, like Hodgson’s The Night Land, cannot find ways to
portray entropy that contradicts the natures of concepts like the hero, the Earth, time, and
civilization. Each of these concepts is superficially changed via deep time and entropy, but in so
changing only reveals an essential, irreducible core—the goal of taxonomy itself. The Earth is
dark but lives. Humanity is reduced by indestructible. The hero is near-divine in his power and
will, transcending time itself to rescue his heroine. All things in the taxonomy have an essential
character, and in the divine spreadsheet have a box in which they can and must ultimately be
placed.
By de-centering the human experience in a networked, non-linear model of scientific
thought and broader analysis, the possibility of “unboxing” things reveals itself. A shortcoming
of utility in taxonomic boxing is that we must move from absolute uniqueness at the individual
level to absolute similarity at the largest group level. “[A] knowledge of emperical individuals,”
Foucault explians, “can be acquired only from the continuous, ordered, and universal tabulation
of all possible differences” (The Order of Things 144). In the inverse direction, all things

56
implicitly must be understood as stemming from one umbrella category, and the most universal
common trait in things seems to be existence. As such, non-existence goes against the character
of things in a taxonomic episteme. For Hodgson, writing in the 1910s, there seems not to have
been a workaround for dramatizing the action of non-existence.
One way that Ian Bogost explains networked consciousness, as opposed to a system
consciousness such as taxonomy, is through film analysis. Analyzing Steven Spielberg’s 2004
movie The Terminal, Bogost explains its failure as a storytelling “system”—its plots underdeveloped, its characters one-dimensional—but its utility as “a framework of general figures for”
examining concepts of waiting (Unit Operations 18). To simplify Bogost’s approach, we can say
system thinking prioritizes story while networked thinking prioritizes themes. We can see this
approach manifesting itself in “The Last Question” and “Entropy.” In “The Last Question,”
Asimov creates a loop in which the story’s ending sets up its beginning, and so on forever.
Pynchon meanwhile creates dueling scenarios in which nothing truly “happens” in a plot sense,
despite an abundance of action in the downstairs party. Instead, he sets up habitats of theme,
exploring chaos, order, computation, human nature, and so on, while realizing no amount of
human inputs can affect the outcome of entropy, thus disrupting the notion of the universe as a
system. The universe has beginning and end for Pynchon, but the universe eludes system-ness
via the inability of any input to alter it. Things happen within the universe, not to it. No input in a
networked universe—not even the triumphant, heroic, enduring human spirit that even the
universe cannot conquer in The Night Land—can change the fundamental fact of total entropy.
Life since the mid-twentieth century has involved increasing amounts of computation and
network-mediated activities and interactions. As such, the emergence of nonhuman-focused
critical approaches seems a natural epistemic shift. And while object-oriented ontology,
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ecocriticism, new media theory, and so on are, to varying degrees, emerging critical trends, their
emergence does not make their impulses explicitly new. Asimov and Pynchon show how such
concepts were influencing creative thought as early as the 1950s. Their work managed to
dramatize total entropy by de-centering the human experience within narrative frameworks.
Entropy as a secular, verifiable apocalypse had existed well before the twentieth century, but the
network-influenced thinking on display in these stories allowed a more faithful reckoning with
its implications.
These stories also disavow notions of linear progress, and that lesson is vital for
understanding the dilemma that Amitav Ghosh explores in The Great Derangement. I argue that
Asimov and Pynchon tackled the secular apocalypse problem sixty years ago. Ghosh describes
the secular apocalypse problem today. The issue is not simply that only two authors found a way
to deal with the problem. Rather, the larger issue is that thought does not follow a linear path.
When Ghosh describes “serious literature,” he describes a literature that, while “uniformly
disdainful of plot and narrative” nevertheless centers the human experience wholly, exploring
“everyday details, traits of character, or nuances of emotion” (27). Despite such literature
emerging alongside network-informed work discussed in this thesis, the work is fixated on the
character of humanity—the most essential component of a Foucauldian taxonomy. And, as
Ghosh argues, the extreme-feeling events of climate catastrophe feel uncanny, as though
contradicting the character of the human experience through their indifference towards it.
William Hope Hodgson could not tell the story of entropy because the could not de-center the
human experience in his storytelling. Isaac Asimov and Thomas Pynchon explored the human
experience within a universe indifferent to that experience, governed by its own laws and forces.
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Apocalyptic forces are similarly indifferent to the human experience, and only be de-centering
humanity can fiction successfully tell the story of the apocalypse during which it now is written.
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